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THE BROWNFIELDS REVITALIZATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACT OF 2001: THE
BENEFITS AND THE LIMITATIONS
ANDREW S. LEVINEt
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of bipartisan wrangling and deadlock surrounding
an overhaul of the Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the United States Senate
has finally hammered out a compromise. 1 The compromise, the
Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of
2001 (the Act) became Public Law No. 107-118 on January 11,
2002.2 The Act is aimed at spurring the cleanup and development
of brownfields. 3 It provides financial assistance to state remediation
t Mr. Levine is Of Counsel at Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP in Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania. Mr. Levine's practice areas include Environmental Law and
Litigation. Mr. Levine received his B.A. magna cum laude and hisJ.D. cum laude
from Tulane University. Mr. Levine extends his thanks to David Burkholder, a
summer associate at Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP, for his assistance in
researching and drafting this article.
1. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seq (1994) [hereinafter CERCLA] (setting regulation
measures for cleanup of environmentally hazardous sites under auspices of Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency).
2. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) [hereinafter the Act] (amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9606, 9607 and adding 42 U.S.C. § 9628). The original Senate bill
was introduced by Senator Lincoln Chafee (R-RI) along with Senators Bob Smith
(R-NH), Harry Reid (D-NV), and Barbara Boxer (D-CA) on February 15, 2001. See
Senator Lincoln D. Chafee Legislative & Information, Chafee Brownfields Bill Becomes
Law, available at http://chafee.senate.gov/pressreleases/01110201.pdf (last vis-
ited March 20, 2002).
3. The United States Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] de-
fines brownfields as "abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial
facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived
environmental contamination." EPA, Brownfields Glossary of Terms, available at
http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/glossary.htm#brow (last visited March 20, 2002).
The Act narrows EPA's definition of brownfields. See Brownfields Revitalization
and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 211, 115 Stat.
2356, 2361 (2002). Section 211 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
(A) In General.-The term brownfield site means real property, the ex-
pansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by
the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollu-
tant, or contaminant.
(B) Exclusions.-The term brownfield site does not include-
(i) a facility that is the subject of a planned or ongoing removal
action under this title;
(217)
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(ii) a facility that is listed on the National Priorities List or is pro-
posed for listing;
(iii) a facility that is the subject of a unilateral administrative order,
a court order, an administrative order on consent or judicial
consent decree that has been issued to or entered into by the
parties under this Act;
(iv) a facility that is the subject of a unilateral administrative order,
a court order, an administratiye order on consent or judicial
consent decree that has been issued to or entered into by the
parties, or a facility to which a permit has been issued by the
United States or an authorized State under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.), the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1321 et seq.) the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.), or the Safe
Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. § 300(f) et seq.);
(v) a facility that-
(I) is subject to corrective action under section 3004(u) or
3008(h) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6924
(u), 6928(h)); and
(II) to which a corrective action permit or order has been is-
sued or modified to require the implementation of cor-
rective measures;
(vi) a land disposal unit with respect to which-
(I) a closure notification under subtitle C of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act has been submitted; and
(II) closure requirements have been specified in a closure
plan or permit;
(vii) a facility that is subject to the jurisdiction, custody, or control
of a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United
States, except for land held in trust by the United States for an
Indian tribe;
(viii) a portion of a facility-
(I) at which there has been a release of polychlorinated bi-
phenyls; and
(II) that is subject to remediation under the Toxic Substances
Control Act; or
(ix) a portion of a facility, for which portion, assistance for re-
sponse activity has been obtained under subtitle I of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act from the Leaking Underground Storage
Tank Trust Fund established under section 9508 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986.
(C) Site-by-site determinations.-
Notwithstanding subparagraph (B) and on a site-by-site basis, the
President may authorize financial assistance under section 104(k) to
an eligible entity at a site included in clause (i), (iv), (v), (vi), (viii),
or (ix) of subparagraph (B) if the President finds that financial assis-
tance will protect human health and the environment, and either
promote economic development or enable the creation of, preserva-
tion of, or addition to parks, greenways, undeveloped property,
other recreational property, or other property used for nonprofit
purposes.
(D) Additional areas.-For the purposes of section 104(k), the term
brownfield site includes a site that-
(i) meets the definition of brownfield site under subparagraphs
(A) through (C); and
(ii) is contaminated by a controlled substance (as defined in sec-
tion 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802)
2
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programs for brownfields revitalization and restricts authority for
enforcement actions under CERCLA in hazardous substance re-
leases addressed by a state response plan. 4
On its face, the Act may appear comforting to investors and
developers who have earnestly waited for an opportunity to capital-
ize on the myriad of brownfields opportunities, but the Act's practi-
cal reach is severely limited by its own shortcomings. Ultimately,
the Act does little to change the weight given to CERCLA and other
environmental liability factors in determining whether to invest in
brownfields redevelopment.
II. BACKGROUND
Brownfields are lands that have been effectively removed from
commercial'use due to the presence or potential presence of haz-
ardous substances, contaminants or pollutants. 5 Brownfield sites
are often located in particularly strategic areas close to existing and
well-maintained infrastructure, such as docks, ports, entry and exit
ramps, and major roadways.6 Despite the proximity to such infra-
structures, brownfields frequently lay blighted and dormant without
improvements, and often exist as repositories for local dumping ac-
(1) (II) (aa) is contaminated by petroleum or a petroleum
product excluded from the definition of 'hazardous sub-
stance' under section 101; and (bb) is a site determined by the
Administrator or the State, as appropriate, to be-
(AA) of relatively low risk, as compared with other petroleum-
only sites in the State; and
(BB) a site for which there is no viable responsible party and
which will be assessed, investigated, or cleaned up by a person
that is not potentially liable for cleaning up the site; and (cc) is
not subject to any order issued under section 9003(h) of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)); or
(11) is mine-scarred land.
Id.
4. See Eric Pianin, Industrial-Cleanup Bill Passes, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 26,
2001, at A18 (describing Senate's environmental cleanup bill which targets
brownfields and aims to boost redevelopment in blighted areas).
5. See American Society of Civil Engineers, Urge Your Senators to Support
Brownfields Revitalization, available at http://www.asce.org/publicpolicy/ka0401_
brownfields.cfm (last visited March 24, 2002) (discussing incentives for restoration
of brownfields which would "aid in the revival of blighted areas, promote sustaina-
ble development, and invest in the nation's industrial strength."); see also EPA, Pres-
ident Signs Legislation to Clean Environment & Create Jobs, available at http://www.epa.
gov/epahome/headline_011102.htm (last visited March 20, 2002) (estimating that
between 500,000 and 1,000,000 brownfields tarnish landscapes of communities
across America).
6. See American Society of Civil Engineers, supra note 5; see also EPA,
Brownfields, available at http://www.epa.gov/epahome/hi-brownfields.htm (last vis-
ited March 20, 2002) (noting that new development on brownfield sites is made
difficult by real or perceived environmental contamination).
2002]
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tivities. 7 Parties best able to revitalize brownfield sites, including
developers, lenders, and investors, have frequently avoided these
properties because of the potential that the owner or operator of
the parcel could be held liable for substantial remediation expenses
under federal and state environmental laws, such as CERCLA.8
While the risk may be small in the aggregate, the economic loss in
the event the risk materializes could be catastrophic to the property
owner. Lenders are substantially insulated from these risks under
CERCLA, which provides broad protection for lenders, as long as
they are acting only to protect their security interest in the property
at issue.9 However, CERCIA does nothing to protect the lender
from a borrower who defaults on his loan because he is unable to
pay both for an expensive remediation and a sizeable construction
loan. 10
As a result, prime urban real estate remained as anchors drag-
ging down local economies and as threats to the public health,
while jobs and local tax revenues migrated to suburban and rural
areas.11 Missing from the equation was a method to revitalize these
lost centers of commerce and provide would-be developers legal
certainty that their efforts to rehabilitate these lands would be a
worthwhile investment. The central purpose of the Act is to help
property owners and developers take advantage of strategically lo-
cated properties, rehabilitate any environmental stigma associated
with them, provide local governments access to tax revenue from
increased real estate values, and help communities designate eligi-
7. See American Society of Civil Engineers, supra note 5.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 9067 (1994). Under CERCIA, liability is determined princi-
pally by section 107(a), setting forth classes of liable "persons," including the
.owner and operator" of a facility, any person who "arranged for the disposal" of
hazardous substances, and any person who "accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to ... sites selected by such person...." Id.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (1994). CERCLA provides an exemption for
secured creditors. Specifically, CERCLA recognizes that "owner or operator" does
not include persons who do not participate in the management of a facility but do
hold an "indicia of ownership" in order to protect a security interest. See id.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1) (1994). A lender who provides financing to a
borrower who owns or operates a facility involving hazardous waste may be held
directly liable for cleanup costs if the lender becomes so involved in the borrower's
business affairs or operations as to become effectively the owner or operator. See
id.
11. See generally Mark Reisch, IB1O011: Superfund Reauthorization Issues in the
10" Congress, available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Waste/waste-28.cfm
(last visited March 20, 2002) (explaining effects of lack of commercial interest in
brownfield sites); see also S. Res. 1481, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted) (statement of
Sen. Chafee).
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ble parcels and give those communities a clear process by which
these parcels can become productive. 12
III. THE BENEFITS
At its core, the Act pumps money and some certainty into the
CERCLA arena. First, the Act authorizes the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to provide $i billion over five years to assist
states with brownfields cleanup and remediation programs.13 Sec-
ond, the Act clarifies CERCLA's liability provisions by providing po-
tential exemptions for bona fide prospective purchasers,
contiguous property owners, and innocent landowners. 14 Third,
the Act establishes a limited bar to CERCLA enforcement by EPA at
sites rehabilitated to the satisfaction of a state remediation pro-
gram, or for which the State evidences a clear intent to implement
a site remediation. 15
Under the Act, EPA may authorize grants to eligible entities,
including a general purpose unit of a local government, a land
clearance authority or other quasi-governmental entity operating
under the supervision and control of, or as an agent of, a general
purpose unit of local government, a government entity created by
state legislature, a regional council or group of general purpose
units of local government, a redevelopment agency, a State, and
Indian Tribes with narrow exceptions. 16 The eligible entities take
inventory, characterize, assess, remediate, and conduct planning re-
12. See S. Res. 1481, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted) (statement of Sen.
Chafee).
13. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 211, 115 Stat. at 2368 (2002).
14. See id. at §§ 221-23, 115 Stat. at 2368-74 (restricting class of persons per-
sonally liable under CERCLA in order to spur redevelopment of brownfields by
individuals and companies).
15. See id. at sec. 231(b), 115 Stat. at 2377. Section 231(b) provides, in perti-
nent part:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and subject to subparagraph
(C), in the case of an eligible response site at which - (i) there is a release
or threatened release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contami-
nant; and (ii) a person is conducting or has completed a response action
regarding the specific release that is addressed by the response action
that is in compliance with the State program that specifically governs re-
sponse actions for the protections of public health and the environment,
the President may not use authority under this Act to take an administra-
tive or judicial enforcement action under section 106(a) or take a judicial
enforcement action to recover response costs under section 107(a)
against the person regarding the specific release that is addressed by the
response action.
Id.
16. See id. at § 211(b), 115 Stat. at 2362 (defining "eligible entity").
2002]
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lated to brownfield sites.' 7 Specifically, the Act appropriates $200
million a year for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 for use by eligible
entities across the country.'8 The additional funding is an attempt
to give greater local control to the revitalization of brownfield
sites. 19
With the average CERCLA remediation costing about $20 mil-
lion, investors and developers have been wary of trying to develop a
site while running the risk of incurring expensive and often un-
known liability.2 0 Through the years, EPA has tried to minimize the
wariness of potential brownfield investors by allowing the use of
"prospective purchaser agreements" and "comfort letters."21 A pro-
spective purchaser agreement is basically a "no action assurance" to
the prospective buyer who purchases contaminated property for re-
development. 22 EPA will not enforce an action under CERCLA if
EPA or the community containing the site derive a clear benefit
from the development plan.23 Comfort letters essentially notify
prospective purchasers that EPA does not intend to take enforce-
ment action with respect to the subject parcel based on information
17. See id. at § 211, 115 Stat. at 2363 (defining permissible scope of program
established by program Administrator).
18. See Brownfields Revitilization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 211, 115 Stat. 2356, 2368 (2002) (allocating $200 million per
year for fiscal years 2002-2006 for grants to local and state governments to assess
and cleanup contaminated brownfield sites and authorizing $50 million per year
over same period for grants to local and state governments to establish and en-
hance brownfields cleanup programs).
19. See Pianin, supra note 4 (noting that Act will give consideration to public
needs, including local, state and regional planning objectives).
20. See Reisch, supra note 11 (summarizing effects of high costs of CERCLA
cleanup programs).
21. See EPA, EPA's Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, available at http://
www.epa.gov/brownfields/pdf/9811-8.pdf (last visited March 20, 2002) (providing
example of purchaser's agreement that limits purchasers' CERCLA liability); see
also EPA, Sample Comfort/Status Letters, available at http://www.epa.gov/
brownfields/pdf/9811-9.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
22. See EPA, Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, Section VIII, United States' Cov-
enant Not to Sue, available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pdf/9811-8.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3, 2002). The EPA's Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, Section
VIII, United States' Covenant Not to Sue provides, in pertinent part:
Subject to the Reservation of Rights in Section IX of this Agreement,
upon payment of the amount specified in Section IV (Payment), of this
Agreement, the United States [and the state] covenants not to sue or take
any other civil or administrative action against Settling Respondent for
any and all civil liability for injunctive relief or reimbursement of re-
sponse costs pursuant to Sections 106 or 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9606 or 9607(a) with respect to the Existing Contamination.
23. See id.
6
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then known to EPA.24 The letters are solely informational and not
binding, making them substantially less valuable than prospective
purchaser agreements. 25
These initiatives, while conceptually responsive to the concerns
voiced by potential buyers of contaminated properties hinge not on
the direct operation of law, but rather upon the discretion of EPA.
Because these efforts are governed by guidance and policy docu-
ments, and not by statute, the process of obtaining such protections
can be unclear, and may depend as much on political will as merit.
However, the Act provides bona fide prospective purchasers at least
some of the uniformity and assurances needed to promote more
brownfields redevelopment.26 The Act affords limited protection
from CERCLA enforcement actions to bona fide prospective pur-
chasers to the extent that the release or threatened release of haz-
ardous substances was not the fault of the purchaser, but only if the
purchaser makes all appropriate inquiries into the previous owner-
ship, and takes steps to stop, prevent, or minimize exposure to haz-
ardous substances. 27 Moreover, where a bona fide purchaser's
liability is premised solely on his being an owner/operator under
CERCLA, the Act absolves the purchaser of liability if he does not
impede a response action or natural resource restoration. 28
Although the Act does not directly increase protection for in-
nocent landowners from CERCILA liability, it does clarify the re-
quirements necessary for an innocent landowner defense. An
innocent landowner can defend against CERCLA enforcement by
showing that he had no reason to know that there was a hazardous
24. See EPA, Policy on the Issuance of Comfort/Status Letters (11/8/96), available at
http://es.epa.gov/oeca/osre/961108.html (last visited March 21, 2002) (explain-
ing EPA provides "comfort" by helping interested parties to understand potential
or need for EPA involvement at brownfield sites).
25. See id. (explaining that "comfort/status letters are provided solely for in-
formational purposes and relate only to EPA's intent to exercise its response and
enforcement authorities under CERCLA at a property based upon the information
presently known to EPA.").
26. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 117-18, § 222, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
27. See id. at § 222, 115 Stat. 2356, 2372. It is also necessary that the bona fide
prospective purchaser provides all legally required notices with respect to the dis-
covery or release of any hazardous substances at the facility, cooperates with and
provides access to persons that are authorized to conduct response actions or natu-
ral resource restoration at a vessel or facility, complies with institutional controls
and land-use restrictions, supplies information sought through a subpoena, and
not be affiliated with the person or entity liable for the response costs. See id.
28. See id. at § 222, 115 Stat. at 2371 (stating to avoid liability, prospective
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substance release on the property.29 In order for an innocent land-
owner to successfully assert the defense, he must satisfy two require-
ments. First, the landowner must demonstrate to a court that on or
before the date on which the landowner acquired the facility, the
landowner carried out all appropriate inquires into the previous
ownership and uses of the facility in accordance with generally ac-
cepted and good commercial and customary standards and prac-
tices. Second, the landowner must demonstrate the taking of
reasonable steps to stop any continuing release, to prevent any
threatened future release and to prevent or limit any human, envi-
ronmental, or natural resource exposure to any previously released
hazardous substance.30 The specific standards and practices will be
promulgated not later than two years after the Act is passed, though
in the interim typical ASTM Phase I Reports31 are deemed to suf-
fice, at least for properties purchased after May 31, 1997.32
Although EPA has stated that it will not impose CERCLA liabil-
ity on contiguous landowners unless their activities have led or con-
tributed to the release of a hazardous substance, the risk of
becoming a potentially responsible party (PRP) exists.3 3 The Act
amends CERCLA to statutorily codify the protections afforded to
contiguous landowners of contaminated or threatened property.3 4
A contiguous landowner holds property touching or similarly situ-
29. See id. at § 223 at 2372 (suggesting innocent landowner can defend
against liability from CERCLA enforcement by showing all appropriate inquiries
were made).
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., ASTM, E1527: Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assess-
ments: Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Process (1994). American Society
for Testing and Materials [hereinafter ASTM] is a private standard-setting organi-
zation that has developed several standard practice guides for environmental site
assessments for commercial real estate. See id.
32. See ASTM, supra note 31 (noting standards and practices, including in-
terim standards and practices). One would have to assume that to the extent the
Phase I Report recommended any Phase II or further study, such additional mea-
sures would have to be undertaken in order to qualify for this statutory protection.
See id.
33. See Robert Meltz, 98-136: Superfund Act Reauthorization: Liability Provisions of
Leading Congressional Proposals, available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/
Waste/waste-24.cfm (last visited March 21, 2002).
EPA policies state that the agency will not seek to impose CERCLA
liability on residential homeowners unless their activities led to the re-
lease, and on owners of land above aquifers contaminated by subsurface
migration from outside the property .... [Nonetheless,] CERCLA does
not exempt a landowner from liability merely because the contamination
on his property arrived there from elsewhere ....
Id.
34. See id. (protecting contiguous landowners from contaminated or
threatened property).
8
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ated to a site that may be contaminated or potentially contami-
nated.3 5 The party seeking protection under this new provision is
typically the victim of passive surface or groundwater migration
from the known area of a hazardous substance release on a neigh-
boring parcel.3 6 The term "facility" in CERCLA includes any area
in which hazardous substances "come to be located," which argua-
bly includes any down gradient property onto which contaminated
surface or groundwater flows. 3 7 Essentially, the Act shields a contig-
uous landowner from CERCLA liability as an owner of part of the
"facility" provided that the owner did not cause or in any way con-
tribute to- the contamination, takes reasonable steps to stop the con-
tamination, and cooperates with the appropriate authorities.3 8
The Act's proposals are groundbreaking, given the long history
of CERCLA's, or perhaps just EPA's, aversion to deferring enforce-
ment to state remediation programs. States have lobbied for more
control over lands held inside their borders, but EPA has been re-
luctant to give up CERCLA enforcement actions to the states.3 9
The experience of conducting numerous remediations has led
many states to develop adequate resources and technical expertise
to perform their own remedial actions without aid or oversight
from EPA.40 As a result, a developer has no assurance that the ful-
fillment of all state remediation requirements will free him from
any further inquiry or enforcement by the federal government
under CERCLA. 41 Generally, the Act exempts sites where an eligi-
ble entity is conducting or has completed a response action ad-
dressing the specific release that was the impetus of the response
35. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 221, 115 Stat. 2356, 2369 (2002).
36. See id. at § 211, 115 Stat. at 2369 (clarifying contiguous property owner
not liable if he did not cause, contribute, or consent to release or threatened
release).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (9) (B) (1994) (defining "facility" to also include site
or area where hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of or
placed).
38. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 221, 115 Stat. 2356, 2368-69 (2002) (describing liability of
contiguous landowners).
39. See Reisch, supra note 11 (noting that states and EPA presently enter into
agreements on site-by-site basis which authorize states to undertake many cleanup
activities otherwise under EPA's control).
40. See id. (observing states' increased experience in managing cleanups as
well as now having resources and technical expertise to independently oversee re-
medial actions).
41. See id. (stating "disagreements between federal and state regulators re-
garding . . . the ultimate selection of a remedy can significantly delay a cleanup
and increase its costs.").
2002]
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plan.42 The provision further limits enforcement actions brought
by the President to certain instances, such as where the state re-
quests assistance, contamination migrates across state lines or into
federal property, imminent and substantial endangerment to pub-
lic health or welfare exists, or where additional response actions are
likely to be necessary. 43
Interestingly, petroleum leaks from underground storage tanks
are not automatically afforded the rights otherwise applicable to
brownfield sites under the Act.4 4 These sites are subject to the en-
forcement deference provisions of Section 231. 45 This provision
gives partial relief to owners and operators of sites subject to this
form of contamination by generally limiting enforcement to state
authorities, if those state programs are deemed adequate under the
elements set forth in that same section. 46 It then becomes a matter
of state law to afford comprehensive liability protection for such
42. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 231(b), 115 Stat. 2356, 2377 (2002) (noting enforcement
must be in compliance with state program that specifically governs response ac-
tions for protection of environment and public health).
43. See id. at § 231(b), § 9628(b) (1) (A) (ii), 115 Stat. at 2377 (delineating oc-
casions where President may bring administrative or judicial action under Act).
44. See id. at § 211, 115 Stat. at 2362. The lack of liability protection for petro-
leum sites present a troubling problem for the Act's efficacy in reducing brown-
field sites. See Brownfields Exemption Sought, INSURANCE CHRONICLE, March 11, 2002,
at 6. According to National Association of Home Builders, the failure to grant
liability relief to innocent parties for sites contaminated with petroleum will hinder
revitalization efforts covering roughly half of the brownfields sites in this country.
See id. For a further discussion of the problems associated with this lack of liability
protection for petroleum sites, see infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
45. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 231(b), 115 Stat. 2356, 2376 (2002) (amending CERCLA and
adding to coverage of state response programs under section 231(b)). Section
231 (b) prevents the President from exercising administrative or judicial enforce-
ment authority over an eligible response site in the absence of certain conditions.
See id. These conditions include instances when a state requests federal interven-
tion when the potential that contamination will spread across state lines and when
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health, welfare, or environ-
ment. See id. at § 231 (b) (1) (B), 115 Stat. at 2377-78.
46. See id. at § 231(b), 115 Stat. at 2377. Section 231(a) sets forth the ele-
ments necessary for a state response program to become eligible for a federal
grant from the Administrator. See id. at § 231 (b), 115 Stat. at 2376. First, the state
or Indian tribe response program must "timely survey and inventory brownfield
sites in the State." See id. at § 231 (b), 115 Stat. at 2376. Second, the program must
contain oversight and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that a response action
will protect human health and the environment. See id. at § 231(b), 115 Stat. at
2376. The program must also demonstrate mechanisms adequate to complete the
necessary response activities in the event of failure to do so by the group con-
ducting the response action. See id. at § 231(b), 115 Stat. at 2376. Third, the state
program must provide meaningful opportunities to allow public participation. See
id at § 231(b), 115 Stat. at 2376-77. Finally, the state program must contain
"[m]echanisms for approval of a cleanup plan, and a requirement for verification
[Vol. XIII: p. 217
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sites unless the owner/operator can make a case under section
211. 4 7 This provision allows a petroleum contaminated site to be
considered a "brownfield site" if either EPA or the state determine
the site poses a relatively low risk in comparison to "other petro-
leum-only sites in the State. ' 48 This relief only seems available for
so-called orphan sites at which there is no potentially responsible
party.49 On the one hand, this could be a distinction without mean-
ing given the definition of "bona fide prospective purchaser."50
Section 222 of the Act makes clear that such status attaches to any
eligible "facility," the definition of which is broad enough to in-
clude service stations.5 1 On the other hand, much of the focus of
the Act itself is providing for the assessment funding mechanisms to
allow communities or other eligible entities to assist in transitioning
brownfield properties back into productive use, which does not ap-
pear to apply to service stations.
Thus, a currently operating service station with historic petro-
leum contamination in the underlying groundwater may not be eli-
gible for many of the Brownfield Revitalization funding provided in
section 211 of the Act, and otherwise available for non-petroleum
sites. 52 This creates a regrettable situation, since an eligible entity
may not be able to assist a financially viable service station owner
with loans or assessment funding, whereas a similarly situated
by and certification ... from the State ... indicating the response is complete." Id.
at § 231(b), 115 Stat. at 2377.
47. See id. at § 211(b), 115 Stat. at 2362 (setting out additional areas covered
as brownfield sites). In lieu of an established state response program with all of
the necessary elements, a state can also qualify for a grant if it "is taking reasonable
steps to include each of those elements . . . ." Id. at § 231(b), 115 Stat. at 2376.
Furthermore, a state may obtain a federal grant by executing a memorandum of
agreement with the EPA Administrator. See id. at § 231 (b), 115 Stat. at 2376.
48. Id. at § 211, 115 Stat. at 2362.
49. See id. at § 211, 115 Stat. at 2361 (requiring that eligible site does not have
viable responsible party).
50. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 222, 115 Stat. 2356, 2371 (2002). For a further discussion of
bona fide prospective purchasers, see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
51. See id. at § 222, 115 Stat. at 2371; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (1994).
For a further discussion of the definition of "facility," see supra note 37 and accom-
panying text.
52. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 211(b), 115 Stat. 2356, 2368 (2002). Section 211 of the Act
provides for some consideration of the financial need of the applicant for Brown-
field Revitalization funding. See id. at § 211 (b) (3) (C) (ii), 115 Stat., at 2368. How-
ever, in order for a facility to be considered eligible for funding in the first
instance, it must first be a "brownfield." The financial viability analysis in that con-
text applies only to the petroleum-contaminated site absent an upfront demonstra-
tion that there is no financially viable remediator. See id.
2002]
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owner of a different form of contaminated property could benefit
from such "seed money" funds.53
IV. THE LIMITATIONS
Despite the accomplishments of the Act, there remains poten-
tially serious problems and uncertainty surrounding CERCLA liabil-
ity. First, the provisions prohibiting enforcement actions against
developers that satisfy qualifying state remediation programs con-
tain elements subject to substantial interpretational breadth.5 4 Sec-
ond, these provisions do not automatically afford enforcement
protections to subsequent purchasers or tenants of the property.55
A severe limitation of the Act is the broad reopener provi-
sion.56 The provision allows EPA to bring an enforcement action
notwithstanding an adequate State Response Program if "new" in-
formation is discovered that was unknown on the earlier of the date
on which cleanup was approved or completed and that indicates a
threat exists at the facility. 57 The Act provides that information is
53. See id. at § 211 (b), 115 Stat. at 2363. For example, an eligible entity could
provide loan funds to a site owner of a "brownfield site." See id. Such funding,
however, may not be available to a service station unless the owner is not finan-
cially viable. See id. If the owner does not qualify under that criterion, there is a
significant question as to whether that owner is a loan candidate in the first in-
stance. See id. Thus, the owner of a more traditional brownfield site, for example,
a lot contaminated with dry cleaning fluid, having a significant cash flow could
qualify for brownfield loans under this program. See id. However, a service station
with a steady cash flow would not qualify to enter the loan pool. See id.
54. See id. at § 231 (b), 115 Stat. at 2376-77 (stating ineligibility of state's re-
sponse program if it fails to provide adequate opportunity for public comment and
participation). For example, if a Pennsylvania developer chooses to implement a
remedy under Act 2, attaining state-wide health standards, public input into the
nature of the remediation may be minimal. See id.
55. For a further discussion of tenant liability under CERCLA, see infra notes
71-79 and accompanying text.
56. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 231(b), 115 Stat. 2356, 2378 (2002).
57. Id. Section 231(b) provides, in pertinent part:
The President may bring an administrative or judicial enforcement action
under this Act during or after completion of a response action described
in subparagraph (A) with respect to a release or threatened release at an
eligible response site described in that subparagraph if-
(iv) the Administrator, after consultation with the State, determines that
information, that on the earlier of the date on which cleanup was ap-
proved or completed, was not known by the State, as recorded in docu-
ments prepared or relied on in selecting or conducting the cleanup, has
been discovered regarding the contamination or conditions at a facility
such that the contamination or conditions at the facility present a threat
requiring further remediation to protect public health or welfare or the
environment. Consultation with the State shall not limit the ability of the
Administrator to make this determination.
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considered "new" only to the extent it was unknown to the State at
the earlier of when the cleanup was approved or completed. 58 This
provision equates roughly to the typical reopener injected by EPA
into Superfund Consent Decrees. 59 However, EPA's reopener gen-
erally impacts adversely the same party that entered into the Con-
sent Decree to resolve its outstanding liabilities with EPA. With
58. See id. One would normally assume that a cleanup is always completed
before it is approved by the State. In the alternative, if EPA wanted to give a
broader interpretation, perhaps the relevant date would be when the State ap-
proved the cleanup plan.
59. See EPA, EPA Model RD/RA Consent Decree, available at http://es.epa.gov/
oeca/osre/docs/010615-a.pdf (last visited March 22, 2002). Section XXI, Cove-
nants Not to Sue By Plaintiffs, of the Model RD/RA Consent Decree provides, in
pertinent part:
91. United States' Pre-certification Reservations. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Consent Decree, the United States reserves, and this
Consent Decree is without prejudice to, the right to institute proceedings
in this action or in a new action, or to issue an administrative order seek-
ing to compel Settling Defendants a. to perform further response actions
relating to the Site, or b. to reimburse the United States for additional
costs of response if, prior to Certification of Completion of the Remedial
Action:
(1) conditions at the Site, previously unknown to EPA, are discovered, or
(2) information, previously unknown to EPA, is received, in whole or in
part, and EPA determines that these previously unknown conditions or
information together with any other relevant information indicates that
the Remedial Action is not protective of human health or the
environment.
92. United States' Post-certification Reservations. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Consent Decree, the United States reserves, and this
Consent Decree is without prejudice to, the right to institute proceedings
in this action or in a new action, or to issue an administrative order seek-
ing to compel Settling Defendants a. to perform further response actions
relating to the Site, or b. to reimburse the United States for additional
costs of response if, subsequent to Certification of Completion of the Re-
medial Action: (1) conditions at the Site, previously unknown to EPA, are
discovered, or (2) information, previously unknown to EPA, is received,
in whole or in part, and EPA determines that these previously unknown
conditions or this information together with other relevant information
indicate that the Remedial Action is not protective of human health or
the environment.
93. For purposes of Paragraph 91, the information and the conditions
known to EPA shall include only that information and those conditions
known to EPA as of the date the ROD was signed and set forth in the
Record of Decision for the Site and the administrative record supporting
the Record of Decision. For purposes of Paragraph 92, the information
and the conditions known to EPA shall include only that information and
those conditions known to EPA as of the date of Certification of Comple-
tion of the Remedial Action and set forth in the Record of Decision, the
administrative record supporting the Record of Decision, the post-ROD
administrative record, or in any information received by EPA pursuant to
the requirements of this Consent Decree prior to Certification of Com-
pletion of the Remedial Action.
2002]
13
Levine: The Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
230 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XIII: p. 217
respect to the Act, a "bona fide prospective purchaser" could bear
the liability under the reopener.60 Thus, a party whose liability is
supposed to have been well-defined and limited bears the risk, not
the party that has been previously notified by EPA of its liability
under CERCLA,.61
One specific concern with this reopener is whether it applies to
new information discovered after a state approves, even prelimina-
rily or conditionally, a proposed cleanup project.62 In implement-
ing the program the remediating party will almost routinely detect
"new" information based upon the most recent round of sampling
data.63 An extreme reading of this provision puts the remediating
party at risk of enforcement each time it submits new data to the
regulating governmental authority.64 Whether this data reveals
greater contaminant concentrations than previously detected or en-
tirely new hazardous substances (perhaps daughter products result-
ing from degradation), the remediating party is placed, at least
theoretically, at risk. 65 Fortunately, the fact EPA must determine
that the facility presents "a threat requiring further remediation to
protect public health or welfare or the environment" partially tem-
pers this result.66 The term "threat" in this context remains unqual-
ified, and largely undefined. To that extent, remediating parties
may find themselves subject to oppressive or undesirable loan terms
because of the theoretical risk that EPA will employ a low threshold
for determining "threat" under this provision. In light of EPA's po-
tential misappropriation, it is not an overstatement to opine that
this exception eclipses the value of the brownfield protections
under the Act.
60. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 222(a), 115 Stat. 2356, 2370 (2002) (defining bona fide pro-
spective purchaser as person or tenant of person that acquires ownership of facility
who can establish by preponderance of evidence that disposal of hazardous sub-
stances at facility occurred prior to person acquiring facility).
61. See id. at § 222, 115 Stat. at 2370 (referring to inquiries bona fide prospec-
tive purchaser supposedly makes into previous ownership and use of facility in
accordance with accepted commercial and customary standards and practices).
62. See id. at § 231(b), 115 Stat. at 2377-78 (asserting that administrative or
judicial enforcement may be brought under Act during or after completion of
response action).
63. See id.
64. See id. For the text of section 231 (b), see supra note 57.
65. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 231(b), 115 Stat. 2356, 2377-78 (2002) (stating discovery of
contamination or conditions that present threat even after EPA Administrator has
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Also, the Act fails to protect subsequent owners and tenants
from CERCLA liability. It specifically exempts a person who "is con-
ducting or has completed a response action regarding the specific
release" under a state response program. 67 Taken literally, the pro-
vision protects only an owner/developer who actually is in the pro-
cess of conducting or has completed a state response plan, and
remains silent with respect to the transferability of the liability ex-
emption. 68 Once an owner completes a remediation at a brown-
field site, no specific provision governs the transferability of the
liability protections to the next owner should the current owner
seek to sell the parcel. 69 This result occurs because the prospective
buyer did not "conduct" or "complete" any program.70 Since the
Act is silent on this point, and given the draconian liabilities that
could inure to the subsequent owner of a brownfield parcel, EPA
will likely require that each new purchaser seek relief under the
provisions of the Act. Presumably, given the property's cleansed
status, this new buyer should qualify as a "bona fide prospective pur-
chaser," and given the known status of the property in question,
EPA will probably streamline the approval process. 71 In that sense,
the brownfield protection does not pass from owner to owner and
each new purchaser becomes a separately protected party. 72
A tenant may face a more difficult process since the Act is
geared toward property "purchasers."73 Under the definition of
"bona fide prospective purchaser," the Act refers to tenants, but
only in the situation in which a tenant buys the property from its
current owner.74 Drafters could possibly inject creative language
into lease agreements such that a lessee is contributing a portion of
67. Id. at § 231(b), 115 Stat. at 2377 (asserting that no administrative or en-
forcement action may be taken under section 106(a) nor may any judicial enforce-
ment action to recover response costs under section 107(a) be taken).
68. See id. (referring to language that excludes persons conducting response
actions regarding specific releases of hazardous substance, pollutant or contami-
nant at eligible response sites).
69. See id.
70. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 231(b), 115 Stat. 2356, 2376 (2002).
71. See id. at § 231(b), 115 Stat. at 2376 (contending that EPA Administrator
may take immediate action after giving notice without State reply during or after
completion of response action, thereby streamlining approval process).
72. See id. at § 222(a), 115 Stat. at 2370-71 (protecting bona fide prospective
purchasers making all appropriate inquiries into previous ownership and use of
facility within Act's standard and practices).
73. See id. at §§ 221-23, 115 Stat. at 2368-74 (exemplifying many sections de-
voted to property owners).
74. See id. at § 222(a), 115 Stat. at 2370 (defining bona fide prospective pur-
chaser to include "tenant of a person" acquiring ownership of facility).
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its rent to a site's cleanup. In that sense, EPA can consider a tenant
to be a party "conducting" a remediation under Section 231, but it
is unclear whether such language will effectively preclude an EPA
enforcement action.75 This remains an open issue, though it is dif-
ficult to imagine EPA taking a uniformly aggressive stance against
tenants on this provision. However, until EPA or Congress provides
greater clarity, tenants will likely insist upon indemnification from
landlords within their lease agreements to insure that if EPA pro-
ceeds against the tenant for contamination not of the tenant's crea-
tion, the landlord will undertake the necessary response actions.
This could create a thorny issue for lease negotiations, but it would
be difficult to justify leaving such an issue unresolved within the
lease.
Finally, the Act provides extremely limited and highly discre-
tionary protection for sites contaminated by petroleum or petro-
leum-related substances. 76  Consequently, despite all the
"protections," the Act does not shield developers of sites contami-
nated by petroleum or petroleum-related substances. 77 Although
such sites may qualify for protection from federal enforcement as
an "eligible response site," their inclusion within the definition of
"brownfield site" thereby granting bona fide purchaser protections,
requires special effort and evaluation by either the state or EPA.78
This in itself creates a bureaucratic hurdle that may be both time
consuming and arbitrary.
This is a most unfortunate result given the sizeable proportion
of potentially eligible sites adversely impacted by petroleum. EPA
itself estimates that of the nearly 450,000 brownfield sites dotting
the American landscape, nearly 100,000 to 200,000 of those sites
contain underground storage tanks or are impacted by petroleum
tank leaks.79 In addition, owners have traditionally located gasoline
service stations in particularly strategic locations, and such locations
often make highly desirable redevelopment sites. Thus, the Act
75. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-18, § 231(b), 115 Stat. 2356, 2375-77 (2002) (excluding from en-
forcement action circumstances where "person is conducting or has completed a
response action.").
76. See id. at § 211 (a), 115 Stat. at 2362 (referring to additional language de-
fining brownfield site as one that is contaminated by controlled substance or petro-
leum product not found in definition of hazardous substance under § 101 of Act).
77. See id. at § 231(a), 115 Stat. at 2375.
78. See id. (requiring preliminary assessment or site inspection and consulta-
tion with State to determine whether eligible response site).
79. See EPA, EPA UST fields Initiative, available at http://www.epa.gov/oust/
ustfield/index.htm (last visited March 22, 2002).
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contains a gaping hole in its coverage that can be rectified only
through the ill-defined discretion of the state or EPA.
V. CONCLUSION
Taken as a whole, the Act significantly moves brownfield rede-
velopment forward. Most importantly, it establishes statutory crite-
ria that an interested party could use to obtain the necessary
protections from EPA. This could be especially useful in instances
in which EPA is exhibiting limited interest in giving prospective
purchaser relief. From the author's perspective, the successful im-
plementation of this Act will still be a function of EPA's and states'
political will to undertake such actions. EPA retains significant dis-
cretion when taking enforcement action at sites, depending upon
the threshold set for determining "threat," and can eviscerate the
case-by-case consideration of including petroleum contamination
within the brownfield program.
Most importantly, as long as EPA interprets the Act's provisions
reasonably, the state-deference provisions constitute a significant
step forward not only in streamlining remediation planning, but
also could serve to enhance the credibility of the state's program.
States will need to be prepared to substantially modify their existing
redevelopment programs to meet all of EPA's delineated approval
criteria. However, for innovative developers, the Act may yet pro-
vide a meaningful opportunity to bolster investment in those com-
munities in greatest need.
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